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Introduction 
Recent high-profile cases have illustrated the dangers of employee investment in 
company stock.  These debacles are unlikely to be the last ones, or even the most severe. 
Companies with more than 50 percent of retirement assets in company stock are 
common, and fractions over 80 percent exist at such large companies as Procter & 
Gamble, Anheuser-Busch, and Pfizer.
1  
The concentration of retirement wealth in company stock is a clear violation of 
diversification principles. Recently, several studies have quantified the economic costs of 
this concentration. Meulbroek (2002) uses a Sharpe-ratio approach and finds that the 
average diversification cost of company stock is about 42% of its value. Ramaswamy 
(2002) uses option-pricing techniques to compute the cost of insuring the extra risk of 
company stock. For a range of plausible parameter values, he finds that this insurance 
would be prohibitively expensive.
2  
Despite these high costs, companies continue to offer employee stock in their 
plans. There are many potential explanations for this behavior, but none are entirely 
satisfying. For example, employers may believe that stock compensation is inexpensive 
relative to cash, that there are strong incentive or morale effects, or that friendly 
employees will aid management in a takeover or other proxy battle. Mitchell and Utkus 
(2002) review these arguments and find little evidence to support them. The only 
explanation with any significant empirical support is tax-driven: dividends paid to certain 
employee ownership plans are tax-deductible at the corporate level. Liang and 
Weisbenner (2002) find a significant relationship between company stock fractions of 
total contributions and dividend payout. Nevertheless, this finding can explain only part Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick                 July 28, 2003  3
of the puzzle, as many firms without any dividends still have significant employee 
ownership of company stock in their plans. 
Even if employers offer their stock, it does not necessarily mean that employees 
must buy it. While many plans make matched contributions in company stock, and some 
of these plans restrict employees’ rights to sell this stock for some period of time, there is 
still a significant amount of discretionary contributions to company stock. Benartzi 
(2001) was the first to investigate this behavior and provided an interesting explanation 
for it. Using a sample of about half of the S&P 500 companies, he finds that discretionary 
contributions to company stock are positively correlated with the past returns on that 
stock. He posits that this correlation is due to employees’ extrapolation of past returns 
when forming expectations about future returns. Liang and Weisbenner (2002) confirm 
this result for a larger number of companies over a longer time period.  
The Benartzi (2001) and Liang and Weisbenner (2002) results use firm-level data 
drawn from SEC filings. These data provide the average contribution fraction to company 
stock for each firm. Thus, these studies use data for a large number of firms to analyze 
cross-sectional relationships between firm characteristics and employee discretionary 
contributions to company stock. Our analysis looks at some similar questions, but our 
approach is distinct and complementary: we use time-series variation in returns at three 
large firms’ 401(k) plans from 1992 to 2000 to identify the effect of returns on the 
company stock choices of 94,191 plan participants. Our main goal is to use this time-
series variation to better understand the mechanisms by which past returns affect 
employee investment. Specifically, we attempt to measure the extent of “feedback” 
investing in company stock: to analyze whether participants are momentum or contrarian Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick                 July 28, 2003  4
investors. Momentum investors trade with a trend, adding to their holdings after high 
returns; contrarian investors do the opposite.  An active finance literature has developed 
in the past few years to look at the empirical evidence on feedback trading.
3  By focusing 
on a salient asset class – company stock – we hope to make a contribution to this 
literature while at the same time providing useful insights for the policy debate on 
company-stock investment. 
In the next section, we describe the data in detail and provide summary statistics 
about the three plans used in our study.  The level of detail in these data allows us to 
study several decision points in the asset allocation decision. When an employee first 
enrolls in a 401(k) plan offered by her employer, that employee becomes a participant in 
the plan and must choose, first, how much of her salary to contribute and, second, how to 
allocate these contributions across the investment options offered by the plan sponsor. All 
of the plans studied in this paper offer the stock of the employer as one of these 
investment options.  
In the third section, we study the other part of this initial enrollment decision, 
focusing on the relationship between the returns prior to the initial contribution decision 
(“initial prior returns”) and the “initial contribution fraction” to an asset class. We find 
that the initial contribution fraction to company stock is significantly related to the past 
one-year returns on that stock. Those influential past returns include both the common 
market-wide component of returns and the company-specific component of returns. For 
both components, high returns induce participants to shift towards company stock and 
away from other equities. The net effect on total equity holding is much smaller, but the 
contributions are much less diversified within equities.  Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick                 July 28, 2003  5
Over time, many participants change their initial decisions. These changes 
provide another channel for past returns to affect contribution fractions. In the fourth 
section, we analyze the relationship between past returns and the direction of contribution 
changes. For this analysis, the returns are measured prior to the change, not prior to the 
initial decision. We again find a strong influence of past returns. Here, high levels of 
company-specific returns induce a substitution towards company stock and away from 
other equities, and a net positive substitution towards all equity.  
Our final set of analyses focuses on  the direct reallocation of portfolio holdings, 
which we call “trades.” There, we study the relationship between the direction of trades 
into or out of an asset class and the prior returns on that asset class. Here, we find that 
high returns induce trades out of company stock and towards other equity, as participants 
seem to be engaging in profit-taking by selling their successful investments. We conclude 
with a summary of our results and a discussion of their implications. 
 
Data 
Our data are provided by Hewitt Associates, a large benefits administration and 
consulting firm. From Hewitt’s roster of clients, we identified three large companies 
(which we denote as Alpha, Delta, and Gamma) that offered company stock as an 
investment option and obtained detailed data on individual participant in each plan. The 
data have two components. The first is panel data on every transaction that occurred in 
the plans since Hewitt took over their administration. These data go from January 4, 1993 
to October 20, 1999 for Alpha; January 31, 1994 to January 26, 2000 for Delta; and April 
3, 1996 to March 3, 2000 for Gamma. The second component of the data is cross-sections Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick                 July 28, 2003  6
taken at year-ends 1998 and 1999 that include demographic, hire and enrollment dates, 
and balances information for all participants had positive balances or plan activity in 
1998 or 1999. We will refer to December 31, 1999 as the “final date.” None of these 
companies are financial services or technology companies.
4  
Table 1 gives demographic statistics for those participants in our sample who 
were active in the plans at the final date. (This is a subset of the 94,191 total employees 
that we observe.) The average plan balance for these participants is $89,172. The most 
comparable cross-sectional data to ours is the EBRI/ICI sample of 401(k) plans, which 
covers about 35 percent of the assets in the 401(k) universe.  Holden and VanDerhei 
(2001) report average plan balances at the end of 1999 broken down by plan size. They 
find that average plan balances are positively correlated with the number of participants 
in the plan, mostly because larger companies tend to have started plans earlier, thus 
giving more time for balances to be accumulated. For plans with greater than 10,000 
participants—like all three of our plans—they report an average balance of $73,672.  
Table 2 breaks down the contribution fraction and asset holdings into three non-
disjoint asset classes. Company stock contribution fractions are 16.6 percent at Alpha, 4.5 
percent at Delta, 12.0 percent at Gamma, and 9.9 percent as a participant-weighted 
average across the three companies. The holdings in company stock are similar to the 
contribution fractions at Gamma, but are significantly higher at Alpha (31.5 percent 
versus 16.6 percent) and Delta (8.1 percent versus 4.5 percent). The disparity at Alpha is 
partly due to the fact that Alpha makes matching contributions in company stock and 
places some tenure restrictions on selling these contributions. Like most clients of Hewitt Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick                 July 28, 2003  7
Associates, Delta and Gamma do not match in company stock and place no restrictions 
on the holdings of company stock.  
These holdings fractions are somewhat lower than the national averages reported 
by Holden and VanDerwei (2001) from the EBRI/ICI database. They find that, among 
large plans (>5000 participants) with similar investment offerings to our sample 
companies, the average holding of company stock is 23.9 percent of the portfolio. Note, 
however, that many of the plans in this class of the EBRI/ICI sample are like company 
Alpha in that they match contributions in company stock and impose some trading 
restrictions on these matched contributions.  Nevertheless, even Alpha has lower 
company stock holdings than the average company that matches in company stock. 
While the main focus of the paper is on company stock, it is also useful to know 
the relationship between past returns and allocation to other asset classes. These 
relationships are not only interesting in themselves, but are also important for knowing 
whether changes in company stock investments crowd out other equities. We consider 
two other asset classes in the paper. “Total equity” includes all equity holdings, domestic 
and international, including company stock.
5 “Other equity” is total equity minus 
company stock. 
The paper studies the initial contribution fractions to these asset classes, the 
subsequent changes in these contribution fractions, and the trades across the classes. 
Before turning to these analyses, it is useful to examine the empirical frequency of 
changes and trades. Figure 1 plots the likelihood of ever having made a change to 
contribution fractions or a trade as a function of tenure in the plan. By three years after 
initial enrollment, 49.8 percent of participants have made at least one change to their Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick                 July 28, 2003  8
initial contribution fraction, and 46.7 percent have made a trade.
6 These two groups 
overlap significantly, so that their union comprises only 58.0 percent of the population. 
By six years after enrollment, these percentages are over 70 percent for each of the two 
activities separately, and 80.0 percent for either.  
Figure 2 plots the frequency of trades per year for all individuals that have at least 
three years participation as of the final date. Within this whole group, 37.9 percent have 
never made a trade. The next highest grouping is between 0.26 and 0.50 trades per year, 
with 37.3 percent of participants falling into this range. Very few participants make more 
than 0.50 trades per year.  Overall, these trading frequencies are somewhat higher than 
for the typical firm in the Hewitt universe, most likely because these firms were “early 
adopters” of the Internet channel for trading and other participant activities (Choi, 
Laibson, and Metrick (2002)). 
 
Initial contribution fractions 
We begin with an analysis of the initial contribution fraction. Our central tobit 
regression equation for this analysis is  
  Yi = α + βXi + εi  (1) 
where Yi is the fraction (censored below at 0 and above at 1) of company stock, other 
equity, or total equity out of the total contribution, Xi is a vector of firm-level and 
participant-level characteristics that may explain the cross-sectional pattern of flow 
decisions, and εi is the participant-level error term. While we employ panel-data notation 
to distinguish among participants and initial dates, these regressions use only one 
observation per participant. The sample includes every participant with positive balances Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick                 July 28, 2003  9
or plan activity in 1998 or 1999. For each member of the sample, we include a single 
observation made on the date they first enrolled in their plan, and all explanatory 
variables for that participant (Xi) are measured on that same date.  
We include several firm-level variables in the Xi vector. Our main variables of 
interest are the past returns on company stock and on the overall stock market. Since we 
would like to separate common shocks (stock market returns) and firm-specific shocks 
(company stock returns), we include two past return variables. SP500 is the past return 
for the S&P 500 in the one year (253 trading days) preceding the enrollment of 
participant i. That is, if participant i enrolls on date t, then SP500i is the return from 
trading date t – 253 to trading date t – 1. CSTOCKi is the excess return over the S&P 500 
for the company stock of participant i. Like SP500, it is measured over the preceding 253 
trading days. Thus, all participants who enroll on the same date t will have identical 
SP500 values; all participants who enroll on the same date t at the same company will 
have identical CSTOCK values. For notational convenience, we drop the i subscripts for 
the remainder of this discussion. 
Previous research finds that investment behavior is also influenced by the 
variance of past returns. Thus, we include two variance measures in X. Std(SP500) and 
Std(CSTOCK) are the standard deviations of the daily returns on the S&P 500 and 
company stock over the 253 trading days preceding the enrollment of participant i. 
Finally, we include a separate fixed effect and trend for each company. The regression 
constant is omitted.  
We include several participant-level variables as elements of X. Many researchers 
have found that total equity fractions are related to age. The most common finding is a Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick                 July 28, 2003  10
hump-shaped relationship between equity holdings and age, with equity fractions first 
increasing and then decreasing later in life, although consistent relationships across 
studies have been elusive.
7  We include age and age
2 as elements of X. In addition, many 
studies show that overall equity holdings are positively related to salary; Holden and 
VanDerhei (2001) confirm this finding in the EBRI/ICI sample. For company stock, 
however, they find little relationship between salary and company stock fractions, with 
just a hint of slight negative tilt at the highest salary levels. Like EBRI, we do not have 
data on wealth, so we rely on salary as a proxy and include the log of annualized salary 
for the year of enrollment as an element of X.  
Company stock contributions may also be related to job tenure. Workers with 
longer tenure at enrollment may differ from other participants along several dimensions. 
First, since they have been at the company longer, they may have more human capital 
dedicated to the company. This should induce lower contributions to company stock, 
other things equal. On the other hand, they may have a greater loyalty to the company 
and feel more of a duty to invest in company stock. Finally, workers who first participate 
later in their careers may have waited because they are less financially sophisticated. This 
lower sophistication may be correlated with poorer diversification and higher 
contributions to company stock. The relative importance of these different factors is an 
empirical question. In the yearend 1998 EBRI/ICI sample, Holden, VanDerhei, and 
Quick (2000) find a positive relationship. We include a variable, TENURE, which is the 
log of 1 + job tenure (in years), as an element of X.  
The results are summarized in Table 3. The dependent variable is company stock 
in column 1, other equity in column 2, and total equity in column 3. The results show a Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick                 July 28, 2003  11
strong impact of past returns on the initial contribution fractions to company stock. The 
coefficient on both SP500 and CSTOCK is positive and significant when the dependent 
variable is company stock (column 1); conversely, the coefficients on these two variables 
are negative and significant when the dependent variable is other equity (column 2).  
These respective coefficients are positive but insignificant for total equity (column 3). 
This pattern of results suggests that when company stock returns are high, newly 
enrolled participants contribute a higher fraction of their flows to company stock and a 
lower fraction of their flows to other equity; on net, the fraction of flows allocated to all 
equity (total equity) tends to cancel.  Thus, these past returns – both the marketwide 
(SP500) and company-specific (CSTOCK) have mostly a compositional effect on overall 
equity holdings. 
For the other independent variables, we find results consistent with previous 
studies. The coefficients on age and age
2 (column 3), while not significant, are consistent 
with a hump-shape relationship between total equity fraction and age. The relationship 
between salary and total equity is positive and significant, while the relationship between 
salary and company stock fraction is negative and significant.    
One possible criticism of these results is that the standard errors are understated. 
If firm-specific shocks induce correlated behavior across participants enrolling around the 
same time, then our assumption of cross-sectionally independent residuals would be 
violated, and our standard errors would be biased downward. For example, if firms 
change their communication strategies to new participants, then these new strategies 
could induce correlated behavior. In this case, we would think that we have more 
independent observations than we really do.  Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick                 July 28, 2003  12
Our regression specification controls for firm-specific differences in average 
behavior (with fixed effects) and for firm-specific changes in this average behavior over 
time (with trend variables for each firm), but to control for firm-specific shocks would 
require a specification of the correlation structure induced by such shocks. This is more 
structure than we are comfortable imposing. Instead, we perform a simple robustness 
check by assuming an extreme case: perfect correlation for all participants who enroll on 
the same day. To do this, we compute the average percentage allocated to each asset class 
by all participants who enrolled on each day. We then perform a separate time-series 
regression of these averages for each firm on the firm-specific independent variables used 
in equation (1). Furthermore, we allow for error correlation across days by computing 
Newey-West (1987) robust standard errors. Even in this extreme case, we find evidence 
that past returns affect contribution allocations. The results are summarized in the 
paragraph below; full tabular results are available from the authors. 
The strongest evidence is for the company stock fraction, where two of the three 
firms show a positive and significant impact of past company stock returns on the 
company stock fraction, and one of the companies shows a positive and significant 
impact of past S&P 500 returns. For other equity, the results are consistent with the 
participant-level evidence from Table 3: the coefficients on company stock are negative 
and significant for two firms, and the coefficients on S&P 500 are negative (but 
insignificant) for all three firms. For total equity, these results appear to cancel, with no 
strong pattern to the coefficient signs. Thus, as for the individual-level results in Table 3, 
it appears that past returns play mostly a composition effect within total equity, with high Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick                 July 28, 2003  13
past returns leading to higher fractions allocated to company stock and lower fractions 
allocated to other equity. 
 
Contribution Fraction Changes 
The preceding section focused on snapshots of flows and the impact of past 
returns on these snapshots. This section examines the determinants of the changes to 
these flows: How do past returns affect changes to flow fractions? We now shift attention 
away from the returns preceding enrollment to the returns preceding specific changes. 
Table 4 summarizes the results of logit regressions for the company stock fraction 
(column 1), the other equity fraction (column 2), and the total equity fraction (column 3). 
The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the fraction is increased 
and zero otherwise. The explanatory variables remain the same as in the previous section, 
except that SP500 and CSTOCK are the returns for the year immediately preceding the 
contribution fraction change. The sample includes every change made by any participant 
who was active in the plans at year-ends 1998 or 1999.
8  
The results demonstrate more evidence of the powerful impact of past returns on 
participant behavior. As in the previous section, we find that the coefficient on CSTOCK 
is positive and significant for the company stock regressions (column 1).  In this case, 
however, the coefficient is also positive (and nearly significant) for other equities, so it 
appears that company stock does not crowd out other equities when contributions are 
changed. Hence, the net effect of CSTOCK on total equity is positive and significant 
(column 3).  Furthermore, another contrast with Table 3 is that the coefficient on SP500 
is negative and significant for company stock (column 1) and is positive and significant Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick                 July 28, 2003  14
for the total equity fraction.  In this case, high returns on the marketwide component of 
company stock returns induce a shift away from company stock and towards other equity, 
with a new effect of shifts towards equity and away from other assets (column 3).   
Overall, participants act like momentum investors for total equity. 
As with the analysis in the previous section, we have some concern that the 
coefficient standard errors in Table 4 may be understated due to firm-specific shocks. As 
a robustness check, we again collapse all the participant observations on each trading day 
down to a single observation for each firm. To do this, we construct a new dependent 
variable, Ymnt, for each asset class m (Company stock, other equity, or total equity) at 
each firm n on every trading date t. Ymnt is a fraction where the numerator is the number 
of participants in firm n who increased their flow fraction to asset m on date t minus the 
number of participants in firm n who made an allocation change to any fund on date t but 
didn’t increase their flow fraction to asset m, and the denominator is all participants at 
firm n who made any allocation change on date t. We then estimate separate time series 
regressions for each firm.  The results are summarized in the paragraph below; full 
tabular results are available from the authors. 
The main question is whether the qualitative results from Table 4 also hold here. 
The answer is yes.  Several coefficients are significant and have the same sign as their 
analogues in Table 4.  These significant coefficients are negative for one firm on SP500 
and positive for two firms for CSTOCK in the company stock regressions; positive for 
two firms on SP500 and negative for one firm on CSTOCK in the other equity 
regressions; positive for one firm on SP500 in the total equity regressions.  Meanwhile, 
no coefficients are significant with the opposite sign as their analogues in Table 4. Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick                 July 28, 2003  15
 
Trades 
The previous sections analyzed the determinants of contribution fractions—the 
investment flows—to company stock and other equity. Many researchers focus on flows 
because those data allow for the cleanest test of the impact of past returns on investment 
decisions. In contrast, studies of asset holdings and past returns suffer from an obvious 
problem: high returns through price appreciation on any given asset will tend to increase 
the fraction of that asset in overall holdings, even if investors take no action. 
Nevertheless, it is asset holdings, not flows, that drive the long-run distribution of wealth. 
In an extreme scenario, one could imagine that all participants rebalance their holdings on 
a regular basis, so that differences in flows cause only minor long-run differences in their 
portfolio allocations.  
For example, consider a participant who wants to have five percent of his overall 
holdings in company stock. Suppose further that this participant allocated 20 percent to 
company stock at his initial enrollment because he had not yet decided to limit company 
stock to 5 percent of his overall portfolio. Now, in later years, he could change his 
contribution fraction in company stock to 5 percent, but he would still require periodic 
rebalances of his holdings to ensure that this five percent fraction is maintained. It may be 
the case that he finds it simpler to rebalance his holdings to 5 percent and ignore the flow 
component in the short run. If so, even though contribution fractions might appear to be 
influenced by returns prior to enrollment, we would not notice any long-run impact of 
these fractions on portfolio diversification. Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick                 July 28, 2003  16
To examine this possibility, we perform several tests. First, we look at the 
rebalancing decision (“trades”) with the same methods used to study changes in the flow 
fraction. We take every trade initiated by employees who had positive balances or plan 
activity in 1998 or 1999 and estimate a separate logit regression for each asset class, 
where the dependent variable takes on a value of one if the trade increased holdings in 
that asset class and zero otherwise.
9  
The results are summarized in Table 5. The key evidence is in column (1). Here, 
we see that returns one year prior to the trade on both components of company stock 
returns (CSTOCK and SP500) induce participants to trade out of company stock, but only 
for SP500 is there a significant effect. For both components, high returns induce 
participants to substitute away from company stock and towards other equities, with 
positive and significant coefficients on both components in column (2). These results are 
consistent with “profit-taking” behavior found in other studies (Odean (1998), Grinblatt 
and Keloharju (2001)), where investors tend to sell “winner” stocks and hold “loser” 
stocks.  Somewhat paradoxically, the net effect on total equity is positive and significant 
for the CSTOCK component, perhaps because rising prices on company stock induce 
participants to feel wealthier and less risk-averse.  
We next perform an analogous analysis at the firm level, using the same approach 
as in previous sections. The dependent variable is the number of participants who 
increased their holdings of the respective asset class in day t minus the number of 
participants who made any trade but didn’t increase their holdings of the respective asset 
class in day t, divided by the number of participants who made any trade in day t. We 
estimate separate regressions for each asset class for each firm. Even in this extreme case, Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick                 July 28, 2003  17
we find evidence that past returns affect contribution allocations. The results are 
summarized in the paragraph below; full tabular results are available from the authors. 
 Consistent with the results of Table 5, we find that the coefficient on SP500 is 
negative and significant for one firm, and negative but insignificant for the other two. For 
other equity, we find that the coefficients on SP500 are positive and significant for all 
three firms.  Overall, it appears that participants act as contrarians in their trades for 
company stock. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper studies the decisions of almost 100,000 individual 401(k) participants. 
Our goal is to better understand the determinants of employees’ discretionary investment 
in company stock. The great detail in the data allows for an analysis at several different 
stages in the 401(k) process. Our main conclusion is that past returns matter for every 
stage. We find that high returns on company stock for the year prior to enrollment induce 
participants to make higher initial contributions to company stock. Furthermore, high 
returns over any one year period induce participants to increase these contribution 
fractions. High returns on company stock have the opposite effect on trading decisions: 
high past returns induce participants to substitute away from company stock and into 
other equities.  Thus, participants are momentum investors when making decisions about 
investment flows but contrarian investors when making trading decisions.  One caveat to 
our results is that our sample of three companies, while including many participants, is 
still small relative the universe of 401(k) participants, and has a relatively low level of 
company stock holdings. Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick                 July 28, 2003  18
These results allow us to build on the important work of Benartzi (2001).   
Benartzi finds a positive relationship between past returns on company stock and current 
contributions to company stock, with the strongest results for past ten-year returns, and 
weaker results for shorter horizons.  We would explain this result as the combination of 
several forces.  First, when participants join, they are influenced by the past returns, 
including the past one-year return.  Some participants never alter these initial contribution 
fractions, and so several distinct past years may seem influential at any point in time, but 
the influence of the most recent year will be limited.  Second, some participants do make 
changes, but these changes are infrequent and fewer than 40 percent make changes in any 
given year. These changes are influenced by the immediate prior returns, but such prior 
returns are often far removed from the current year.  Again, we see that the influence of 
the most recent year is limited.  Taken together, the initial contributions and the 
contribution changes are both influenced by one-year returns, but these years are spread 
out over a long period.  Then, when we look for a relationship between current 
contributions and past returns, the longer period appears better at the company level.    
  Our most interesting and policy-relevant findings are for the relationship between 
asset holdings and past returns.  Absent frequent rebalancing, high returns on assets will 
tend to increase the allocation to these assets. Thus, it is very difficult to directly test for a 
relationship between asset holdings and the past returns on these assets.  The best we can 
do is to try to infer these relationships by looking at the different decisions made by 
investors.  Since most previous studies have used cross-sectional snapshots of holdings 
and contribution fractions, they have logically focused on the latter as the cleanest source 
of data.  These studies find – as do we – that high past returns on company stock tend to Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick                 July 28, 2003  19
increase contribution fractions to company stock. Using the time-series data in this paper, 
we see that trading decisions may work to mitigate some of this effect. Since high past 
returns induce participants to substitute out of company stock, the strong relationship 
between past returns and contributions is less dangerous for asset allocation than it might 
appear from these previous studies.   
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Demographic Summary Statistics 
This table presents summary statistics for the data on 401(k) participants. Unless 
otherwise noted, all figures are as of year-end 1999. 
 
Average age
  45.0 
Average salary
  $55,830 
Average tenure at company
  15.8 years 
Average elected contribution rate  8.73% 
Average plan balance  $89,172 
Percent who traded in 1999  39.3% 
Total companies  3 
Total participants (all years)  94,191 
Source: Authors’ calculations.Table 2 
Equity Summary Statistics 
This table presents the proportion of discretionary contributions and year-end balances 
that were in equities in 1999.  
 
   Company stock
(1) 
Other equities 
(2) 
All equities 
(3) 
Company Alpha  Contributions 16.6%  51.8%  68.4% 
  Holdings 31.5%  39.7% 71.2% 
Company Delta  Contributions 4.5%  49.6%  54.1% 
  Holdings 8.1%  48.6% 56.7% 
Company Gamma  Contributions 12.0%  52.1%  64.1% 
 Holdings  11.4%  53.5%  64.8% 
Total Contributions  9.9%  50.8%  60.7% 
 Holdings  17.7%  46.0%  63.6% 
Source: Authors’ calculations Table 3 
Initial Contribution Allocation, 11/30/1992 – 2/17/2000,  
as a Function of Asset Returns Prior to Plan Enrollment 
The dependent variable in column 1 is the percent of the participant’s first payroll contribution 
that went to company stock, the dependent variable in column 2 is the percent of the participant’s 
first payroll contribution that went to other equities, and the dependent variable in column 3 is the 
percent of the participant’s first payroll contribution that went to all equities. Coefficients shown 
are for tobit regressions censored at 0 and 1. SP500 is the cumulative return on the S&P 500 for 
the 253 trading days prior to the participant’s enrollment in the plan. CSTOCK is the cumulative 
return in excess of the S&P 500 on company stock for the 253 trading days prior to participant 
enrollment. Std(SP500) and Std(Cstock) are the standard deviations of the S&P 500 and company 
stock returns, respectively, over the 253 trading days prior to the participant’s enrollment. Salary 
is the log of annual salary in the year of enrollment (in 1999 CPI-deflated dollars), Age is the 
participant’s age at the time of enrollment, Age
2 is the square of Age, and Tenure is the log of one 
plus the years between the participant’s original hire date and plan enrollment date. Company 
Trend x is the years between December 31, 1980 and the participant’s enrollment if the 
participant is in Company x, and zero otherwise. σ(ε) is the standard deviation of the latent 
variable’s residual. Coefficients on fixed-effect company dummies and a constant are not shown. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the point estimates.  
 
 
 Company stock  
(1) 
Other equities  
(2) 
All equities 
(3) 
SP500  0.80** 
(0.07) 
-0.46** 
(0.06) 
0.04 
(0.07) 
CSTOCK  0.45** 
(0.04) 
-0.14** 
(0.03) 
0.07 
(0.04) 
Std(SP500)  -12.76* 
(5.16) 
-3.36 
(4.10) 
-2.21 
(4.79) 
Std(CSTOCK)  -12.13** 
(3.55) 
-2.47 
(2.91) 
0.39 
(3.41) 
Salary  -0.08** 
(0.01) 
0.16** 
(0.01) 
0.11** 
(0.01) 
Age / 100  0.02 
(0.50) 
0.26 
(0.41) 
0.24 
(0.48) 
Age
2 / 1000  0.04 
(0.06) 
-0.09 
(0.05) 
-0.05 
(0.06) 
Tenure  0.02* 
(0.01) 
-0.06** 
(0.01) 
-0.04** 
(0.01) 
Company Trend α  0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.02** 
(0.00) 
0.02** 
(0.00) 
Company Trend δ  -0.08** 
(0.01) 
0.17** 
(0.01) 
0.14** 
(0.01) 
Company Trend γ  0.07** 
(0.02) 
0.06** 
(0.02) 
0.08** 
(0.02) 
σ(ε) 0.76** 
(0.01) 
0.69** 
(0.01) 
0.80** 
(0.01) 
* Significant at the 5 percent level 
** Significant at the 1 percent level 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 Table 4 
Probability of Increasing Contribution Fraction, 12/31/1992 – 3/3/2000, 
as a Function of Asset Returns Prior to the Election Change 
This table presents the results of a binary logit regression of the probability a participant increases 
the fraction of his or her contribution to company stock (column 1), other equities (column 2), 
and all equities (column 3), conditional on making a change to his or her contribution allocations. 
SP500 is the cumulative return on the S&P 500 for the 253 trading days prior to the participant’s 
first contribution after an election change. CSTOCK is the cumulative return in excess of the S&P 
500 on company stock for the 253 trading days prior to the post-change contribution. Std(SP500) 
and  Std(CSTOCK) are the standard deviations of the S&P 500 and company stock returns, 
respectively, over the 253 trading days prior to the post-change contribution. Salary is the log of 
annual salary in the year of the post-change contribution, and Total Balances is the log of total 
balances in the plan in the calendar month prior to the change, both in 1999 CPI-deflated dollars. 
Age is the participant’s age at the time of the post-change contribution, Age
2 is the square of Age, 
and Tenure is the log of one plus the years between the participant’s original hire date and the 
post-change contribution. Company Trend x is the years between December 31, 1980 and the 
participant’s post-change contribution if the participant is in company x, and zero otherwise. 
Coefficients on fixed-effect company dummies and a constant are not shown. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses below the point estimates. Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
 Company stock  
(1) 
Other equities  
(2) 
All equities 
(3) 
SP500  -2.09** 
(0.10) 
2.85** 
(0.08) 
1.02** 
(0.08) 
Cstock  0.59** 
(0.04) 
0.06 
(0.03) 
0.23** 
(0.03) 
Std(SP500)  -148.70** 
(5.45) 
39.67** 
(4.58) 
-47.97** 
(4.60) 
Std(Cstock)  1.62 
(3.97) 
-5.40 
(3.42) 
16.49** 
(3.40) 
Salary  -0.14* 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.09** 
(0.02) 
Total Balances  -0.14** 
(0.01) 
-0.08** 
(0.01) 
-0.13** 
(0.01) 
Age / 100  2.66** 
(0.69) 
3.73** 
(0.58) 
4.18** 
(0.58) 
Age
2 / 1000  -0.23** 
(0.08) 
-0.47** 
(0.07) 
-0.40** 
(0.07) 
Tenure  -0.01 
(0.01) 
0.04** 
(0.01) 
0.18** 
(0.01) 
Company Trend α  0.40** 
(0.01) 
-0.36** 
(0.01) 
-0.20** 
(0.01) 
Company Trend δ  0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.10** 
(0.01) 
-0.02** 
(0.01) 
Company Trend γ  0.22** 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.23** 
(0.01) 
* Significant at the 5 percent level   
** Significant at the 1 percent level 
Source: Authors’ calculations. Table 5 
Probability of Trading into Asset Class, 1/4/1993 – 3/6/2000, 
as a Function of Asset Returns Prior to Trade 
This table presents the results of a binary logit regression of the probability a participant 
makes a trade increasing his or her holdings in company stock (column 1), other equities 
(column 2), or all equities (column 3), conditional on the participant trading. SP500 is the 
cumulative return on the S&P 500 for the 253 trading days prior to the trade. CSTOCK is 
the cumulative returns in excess of the S&P 500 on company stock for the 253 trading 
days prior to the trade. Std(SP500) and Std(CSTOCK) are the standard deviations of the 
S&P 500 and company stock returns, respectively, over the 253 trading days prior to the 
trade. Salary is the log of annual salary in the year of the trade, and Total Balances is the 
log of total balances in the plan on the day of the trade, both in 1999 CPI-deflated dollars. 
Age is the participant’s age at the time of the post-change contribution, Age
2 is the square 
of Age, and Tenure is the log of one plus the years between the participant’s original hire 
date and the trade date. Company Trend x is the years between December 31, 1980 and 
the participant’s trade if the participant is in company x, and zero otherwise. Coefficients 
on fixed-effect company dummies and a constant are not shown. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses below the point estimates. 
 
 
 Company stock  
(1) 
Other equities  
(2) 
All equities 
(3) 
SP500  -2.18** 
(0.06) 
2.31** 
(0.05) 
0.09 
(0.05) 
CSTOCK  -0.01 
(0.02) 
0.31** 
(0.02) 
0.07** 
(0.02) 
Std(SP500)  -159.70** 
(4.24) 
71.28** 
(3.86) 
-62.22** 
(3.71) 
Std(CSTOCK)  -36.62** 
(2.33) 
-20.47** 
(2.26) 
-26.88** 
(2.14) 
Salary  0.04** 
(0.01) 
0.08** 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
Total Balances  -0.07** 
(0.01) 
-0.02** 
(0.00) 
-0.03** 
(0.00) 
Age / 100  4.47** 
(0.56) 
-2.83** 
(0.50) 
1.24** 
(0.48) 
Age
2 / 1000  -0.52** 
(0.06) 
0.26** 
(0.05) 
-0.09 
(0.05) 
Tenure  0.07** 
(0.01) 
-0.05** 
(0.01) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
Company Trend α  0.50** 
(0.01) 
-0.26** 
(0.01) 
0.15** 
(0.01) 
Company Trend δ  0.10** 
(0.01) 
-0.12** 
(0.01) 
0.05** 
(0.01) 
Company Trend γ  0.56** 
(0.02) 
-0.26** 
(0.01) 
0.05** 
(0.01) 
* Significant at the 5 percent level   
** Significant at the 1 percent level 
Source: Authors’ calculation  
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
0123456
Years in plan
% traders
% election
changers
% who did
either
Figure 1. Likelihood of trading, changing elections, or doing either at least once, by 
tenure in plan, 12/31/1992 – 3/6/2000. We examine all people for whom we have data 
since their initial enrollment in the plans. The graph depicts the percent of participants 
who have made at least one trade, changed their discretionary contribution allocations at 
least once, or done either, plotted against the number of years we observe them in the 
plan. Source: Authors’ calculations. 0%
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Figure 2. Histogram of participant trades per year, 1999 participants. We examine 
all people who are active in the plans as of year-end 1999 and who have been 
participating for at least three years. We divide the total number of times a participant has 
traded in our data by the number of years we observe the participant. The graph is a 
histogram of this ratio. Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 